Thompson v. City of Monrovia, 186 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2010)
Officer Matthew Donald Thompson sued the Monrovia Police Department for harassment and a hostile work environment arising from offensive remarks and behavior that were allegedly directed at an African-American colleague. Thompson also alleged he suffered retaliation for having reported the racism. The trial court granted summary judgment to the police department, and the
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
The City of Ontario’s Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy provides that use of the city’s computers and other electronic equipment, networks, etc., is limited to city-related business, that access is not confidential and “users should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” Sergeant Jeff Quon, a member of the city’s SWAT team, signed an employee acknowledgement of the Policy and attended a meeting in which he and others were informed that text messages were considered to be the same as e-mail and could be audited by the department. However, Quon was later told that the content of his text messages would not be audited so long as he paid the department for any charges associated with texting more than 25,000 characters in a billing cycle. When a lieutenant in the department “grew weary” of being a bill collector for officers who exceeded the 25,000 character limit, the department contacted Arch Wireless and requested transcripts of the text messages. After the department received the transcripts from Arch, internal affairs conducted an investigation to determine “if someone was wasting city time not doing work when they should be.” The investigation revealed that many of Quon’s messages were personal in nature and sexually explicit.
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010)
Plaintiffs in this case (more than 6,000 African-Americans) had applied to serve in the Chicago Fire Department. They challenged as discriminatory the city’s decision to hire only applicants who had scored 89 or above on a written examination. The city stipulated that the 89-point cutoff had a “severe disparate impact against African Americans,” but argued that the cutoff score was justified by business necessity. Although plaintiffs won at the district court level, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ suit was untimely because the earliest EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after the only discriminatory act – sorting the scores into the “well-qualified,” “qualified” and “not-qualified” categories.
Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010)
Rolando Hernandez alleged claims of race and national origin discrimination based on disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment while he was employed as a mechanic in the Fire Shop of the City of Vancouver, Washington. Hernandez sued the city and another employee, Mark Tanninen. Hernandez was initially represented by attorney Gregory Ferguson. Hernandez told Ferguson that Tanninen had witnessed the discrimination and would corroborate his story. Ferguson interviewed Tanninen, who did initially corroborate Hernandez’s story, but after speaking with the Deputy Fire Chief, Tanninen decided his getting involved would not be good for the Deputy Fire Chief and “everyone involved.” Since Ferguson was a witness to Tanninen’s original statements corroborating the allegations, Ferguson referred the case to another attorney.
Bowman v. Wyatt, 186 Cal.App.4th 286 (2010)
Plaintiff Barry A. Bowman filed this case after suffering devastating injuries when his motorcycle collided with a dump truck owned and operated by Tommie Wyatt, Jr. The collision occurred shortly after Wyatt had delivered a load of asphalt to a work site of the City of Los Angeles with which Wyatt was under contract. The jury found that Wyatt was an employee of the city and returned a verdict in Bowman’s favor in the amount of $15.7 million. On appeal, the city argued that the trial court had misinstructed the jury on the factors it should consider in determining whether Wyatt was an employee or independent contractor of the city.
Baker v. American Horticulture Supply, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1059 (2010)
Edwin Baker worked as an independent wholesale sales representative for American Horticulture Supply, Inc. (“AHS”). A jury returned verdicts in Baker’s favor on his breach of contract and fraud claims, but the trial court ordered a new trial on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence, excessive damages and juror misconduct. The trial court granted AHS’s motion for directed verdict as to Baker’s statutory claim for violation of the Independent Wholesale Sales Representatives Contractual Relations Act of 1990 (Cal. Civ. Code § 1738.10, et seq.) on the ground that there was no evidence that AHS’s violation of the statute was “willful.” The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ordering a new trial on the non-statutory claims, but reversed its dismissal of the statutory claim after concluding that “there is no evidence … the Legislature intended to immunize a nonwillful violation of the Act.”
Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 Cal.App.4th 338 (2010)
Gurpreet Singh moved from India to California to work as a general manager for Southland Stone. After Singh resigned and returned to India, he filed suit against Southland and its president (Ravinder S. Johar), alleging various contract and tort claims. The jury awarded Singh more than $980,000 for past and future noneconomic damages, economic damages, unpaid wages and punitive damages. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in part (as to the denial of the breach of contract claim and the award of $6,800 in wages whose payment defendants conditioned upon Singh’s signing a release), but otherwise reversed the judgment. The Court reversed the judgment on the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (because Singh was employed at will) and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (because it was barred by the exclusive remedy of the Workers’ Compensation Act) and ordered the trial court to enter judgment for defendants on those claims.
Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Assocs., Inc., 185 Cal. App. 4th 1363 (2010)
Plaintiffs sought to represent and certify a class of 4,000 current and former employees of Boyd & Associates, which provides security guard services throughout Southern California. Plaintiffs alleged that Boyd denied the putative class members off-duty meal periods and rest breaks and that it had failed to include certain reimbursements and an annual bonus payment in calculating the employees’ hourly rate of overtime pay.
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35 (2010)
Plaintiffs are seasonal agricultural workers whom Munoz & Sons had employed during the 2000 strawberry season. The employees sued Munoz and two produce merchants (through whom Munoz sold strawberries) for alleged minimum wage violations. Following Munoz’s bankruptcy, plaintiffs contended that the produce merchants were joint employers along with Munoz; that plaintiffs were the third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Munoz and the merchants; and that they were parties to an oral employment agreement with one of the merchants. The California Supreme Court held that although the Industrial Wage Commission’s (“IWC”) wage orders do generally define the employment relationship in actions to recover unpaid minimum wages, the IWC’s definition of “employer” does not impose liability on individual corporate agents acting within the scope of their agency.
Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll., 605 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2010)
Professor Walter Kehowski sent three racially-charged emails over a distribution list maintained by the college district where he teaches math. Every district employee with an email address received Kehowski’s messages, including plaintiffs in this case – a certified class of the district’s Hispanic employees. Plaintiffs sued the district, its governing board and two district administrators, claiming their failure to properly respond to the emails created a hostile environment in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.