Goldstein v. CUIAB, 2019 WL 1923530 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)

Steven M. Goldstein applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits from March 23, 2013 through August 10, 2013 after which time he ceased receiving unemployment benefits because he began receiving disability benefits, which continued until September 2014. Goldstein’s second claim for unemployment insurance benefits had an effective date of March 23, 2014. The Employment

California Assembly Member Miguel Santiago (D-Los Angeles) has introduced legislation (Assembly Bill 3042) that would recognize “International Workers’ Day” as a public holiday for students and school employees in the state.  The bill would authorize school districts and charter schools to designate May 1 as “International Workers’ Day” with schools to be closed – and employees to be paid – for the “holiday.” 

West Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CUIAB, 2014 WL 6852700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)

After leaving his job as a massage therapist at West Hollywood Community Health & Fitness Center (d/b/a “Voda Spa”), Mario Serban applied for unemployment benefits. The Employment Development Department sent Voda Spa a letter indicating that Serban had been an employee (and not an independent contractor) and that

On September 10th, California became the second state in the country to require businesses to provide employees with paid sick leave, following Governor Jerry Brown’s signing of A.B. 1522, which goes into effect on July 1, 2015, and will be known as the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014.

Click here to read our detailed post about A.B. 1522.

California Governor Jerry Brown has until September 30th to sign or veto A.B. 1522, a recently passed bill that would require businesses employing at least one person in California to provide employees with paid sick leave and to comply with new recordkeeping and informational requirements. If signed by the governor, the bill will become effective on July 1, 2015.

Most employees would accrue one hour

Paratransit, Inc. v. CUIAB, 2014 WL 2988013 (Cal. S. Ct. 2014)

Craig Medeiros worked as a vehicle operator for Paratransit for six years. Medeiros was a member of a union, and the union and the employer were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Paratransit investigated a complaint filed by a passenger, alleging that Medeiros had unlawfully harassed her. Following the investigation, Paratransit concluded the

Owen v. Macy’s, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 462 (2009) 

Lisa Owen worked as a sales associate at Robinsons-May until it was acquired by Macy’s in August 2005. In January 2006, employees at the Arcadia store where Owen worked were informed that the store would close by April. After the store closed on March 18, 2006, Owen received her final pay, which included no

Introduction

On May 18, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) issued new proposed regulations that allow plan sponsors of Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) Section 401(k) or 403(b) safe harbor plans to reduce or suspend non-elective contributions mid-year if they are experiencing a “substantial business hardship.” Prior to the proposed regulations, a plan sponsor could suspend non-elective contributions under a safe harbor plan only by terminating the plan. The proposed regulations apply to both traditional safe harbor plans and those that qualify as “qualified automatic contribution arrangements” (QACAs), a type of automatic enrollment plan introduced under the Pension Protection Act of 2006 for plan years beginning in or after 2008. The proposed regulations mirror current regulations that allow sponsors of plans with safe harbor matching contributions to reduce or suspend such contributions mid-year.

Plan sponsors may rely on the proposed regulations immediately (i.e., effective for amendments adopted after May 18, 2009) pending issuance of final regulations. If the final regulations are more restrictive than the proposed regulations, the final regulations will only apply prospectively.

In a 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court has held that AT&T did not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) when it based its calculation of employees’ pensions in part on a pre- PDA accrual rule that treated pregnancy leave less favorably than other forms of disability leave. AT&T Corp v. Hulteen, No. 07-543 (May 18, 2009). The Court’s decision reversed the Ninth Circuit and confirmed the presumption that discrimination statutes will not be applied retroactively.

Background

Plaintiffs were Noreen Hulteen and three other AT&T employees who had taken pregnancy leave before April 29, 1979, the effective date of the PDA. At the time they took leave, AT&T based employee pension benefits on a seniority system (i.e., a system based on length of service) that provided less service credit for pregnancy leaves than it did for other forms of temporary disability leave. When the PDA took effect, AT&T changed its system and began to provide full service credit for pregnancy leaves. It did not, however, retroactively adjust the accrued service credits of Plaintiffs or any other employees who previously had taken pregnancy leave. Therefore, when those employees retired, they received an overall pension amount that was less than it would have been if AT&T had afforded full service credit to their pre-PDA pregnancy leaves.

Plaintiffs and their union filed suit against AT&T in the Northern District of California alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the PDA. Plaintiffs argued that it was unlawful for AT&T, in the present day, to apply a seniority-based pension system that incorporated antiquated pre-PDA accrual rules that had differentiated on the basis of pregnancy. Doing so, Plaintiffs contended, carried forward the old service credit differential so as to produce a disparate effect in the amount of the pension benefits of employees who had taken pre-PDA pregnancy leave. The district court agreed, holding that AT&T had engaged in unlawful pregnancy discrimination, and the Ninth Circuit, en banc, affirmed. Because the Ninth Circuit’s decision directly conflicted with rulings from other circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.