SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 89

RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER

ANDREW RUDNICKI, Plaintiff, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, *et al.*, Defendants.	Case No: BC630158 Hearing Date: November 30, 2022

Plaintiff's Andrew Rudnicki's motion for attorney fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $2,266,704.00, inclusive of a modest multiplier of 1.1.

On August 10, 2016, Plaintiff Andrew Rudnicki ("Plaintiff") initiated this wrongful termination action against Defendants Farmers Insurance Exchange, Farmers Group, Inc., and other Farmers-related entities.

On December 14, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him $5,413,344.00 in compensatory damages. The jury found that Plaintiff was employed by Defendants Farmers Insurance Exchange and Farmers Group, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants") and that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff and terminated Plaintiff in violation of public policy. On December 16, 2021, the jury awarded Plaintiff $75,000,000.00 in punitive damages against each defendant.

On March 17, 2022, judgment was entered against Defendants.

On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed his memorandum of costs.

On May 27, 2022, the Court denied Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. On the same day, the Court also granted in part Defendants'

Motion for New Trial on the issue of punitive damages, unless Plaintiff accepted a remittitur of the punitive damages in the amount of $18,945,000 (3.5 to 1 ratio), jointly and severally, against Defendants.

On June 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of acceptance of remittitur of punitive damages.

On June 28, 2022, the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs in part, awarding Plaintiff costs in the reduced amount of $181,135.76.

Now under consideration is Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, which was filed on September 7, 2022. Plaintiff moves pursuant to Government Code § 12965(c)(6) for an award of attorney fees in the total amount of $6,663,815.00, inclusive of a lodestar multiplier of 2.0, on the ground that the requested attorney fees are reasonable, and the lodestar multiplier is warranted. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion.

Legal Standard

A prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(10).) "Prevailing party" includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (CCP § 1032(a)(4).) In all other circumstances, the "prevailing party" shall be as determined by the court. (*Id.*)

The fee setting inquiry ordinarily begins with the "lodestar," i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (*PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler* (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) "The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of facts specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided." (*Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 774.)

The prevailing party bears the burden of proof and the amount is left to the trial court's sound discretion. (*Christian Research Institute v. Alnor* (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1320.) "A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether." (*Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635.)

Discussion

1. Prevailing Party

"Because FEHA does not define the term 'prevailing party,' prevailing party status is determined in this context based on an evaluation of whether a party prevailed on a practical level, and the trial court's decision should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In applying this standard, the trial court must identify the prevailing party "by analyzing the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives." (*Bustos v. Global P.E.T., Inc.* (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 558, 562–563 [internal citations omitted].)

The Plaintiff achieved the relief sought in monetary recovery, therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action.

2. Reasonableness of Requested Attorney Fees

Plaintiff seeks a lodestar attorney fee award of $3,331,907.50. Plaintiff claims that his requested attorney fees award is reasonable in both the hourly rates of his attorneys as well as the hours spent litigating this action.

"Even after determining that a party is entitled to fees because it 'prevailed,' the trial court must still determine what amount of fees would be 'reasonable' in light of the relative extent or degree of the party's success in obtaining the results sought." (*Sokolow v. County of San Mateo* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 247.) It has long been settled in California that the experienced trial judge is in the best position to determine the reasonableness of a request for attorney fees. (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49.) While the starting point is the "lodestar calculation," other considerations come into play, including the nature and difficulty of the case, the amount of money at issue, the skill required and the success or failure of the lawyers. (*EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler* (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774.)

The Court shall address the reasonableness of the hourly rates and of the hours for work performed in turn.

a. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Defendants object to the hourly rates of Plaintiff's counsel. (Opposition at pp. 10-11.)

Here, Plaintiff presents the following hourly rates for each counsel associated with this case: (1) $1,425.00 for Shegerian; (2) $1,100.00 for Nguyen; (3) $1,000.00 for Reed; (4) $1,000.00 for McDonell; (5) $900.00 for Counsel Madjidi; (6) $850.00 for Counsel Rodriguez; (7) $825.00 for Counsel Lim; (8) $750.00 for Counsel Gbewonyo; (9) $750.00 for Avagyan; (10) $700 for Livshits; (11) $625.00 for David; and (12) $550.00 for Lynch. (See Motion at pg. 13; Shegerian Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, 24-27; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 10;

Reed Decl. ¶ 4; Leovshits Decl. ¶ 3; Madjidi Decl. ¶ 11; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 3; Lim Decl. ¶ 3.)

In support of these rates, Plaintiff first relies on market noncontingent rates from partners, associates, and law clerks of a few large sized law firms. (Motion at pp. 10-11.) However, the usage of this data is misleading because by presenting hourly rates from only large sized firms, it does not accurately represent comparable legal services in the Los Angeles area, which should at least include mid-sized firms. (See *Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) The Court notes that the Shegerian firm falls in the category of a larger small sized firm. Second, Plaintiff relies on prior hourly rates that have been found reasonable by other courts within Los Angeles County. (Motion at pp. 11-12.) Plaintiff claims that "Attorneys Shegerian, Nguyen, Lim, Livshits, and David have court-approved hourly rates of $1,300, $1,000, $750, $600, and $500 respectively." (Motion at pg. 12; Exh. 21.) Plaintiff's evidence suggests that Mr. Shegerian's hourly rate of $1,200 has been approved since 2020, and before then, his hourly rates of $1,100 was approved in four instances. (Shegerian Decl. ¶¶ 7.) Third, Plaintiff presents evidence to show that hourly rates exceeding $1,000 has become common place since the early and mid-2010s. (Motion at pg. 12; Exhs. 23-26.) And fourth, Plaintiff relies on declarations from long practicing and experienced attorneys Nicholas Rowley, Gary A. Dordick, and Arash Homampour who all assert that the requested rates are reasonable. (Rowley Decl. ¶¶ 11, 18-19; Dordick Decl. ¶ 9; Homampour Decl. ¶¶ 18-22.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that the fees of attorneys Shegerian, Nguyen, Reed and McDonell are excessively high and point out that more than 50% of the hours spent by all attorneys were billed by partners or senior associates, which suggest an improper delegation of tasks performed. (Opposition at pg. 10.) Defendants also argue that the hourly rates should be reduced to represent historical billing rates because Plaintiff repeatedly delayed trial. (Opposition at pp. 10-11.) Defendants propose the following rates: "Mr. Shegerian ($1,000), Mr. Nguyen ($800), Mr. Reed ($700), Mr. Livshits ($325), Ms. Madjidi ($600), Mr. Lim ($600), and Mr. David ($250)." (Opposition at pg. 11.) Furthermore, Defendants rely on prior rulings by various judges that reduced the hourly rates proposed by Plaintiff's counsel. (Opposition, RJN Exhs. 1-6.) Additionally, Defendants contend that the Court should decline awarding any fees associated with attorneys McDonnell, Gibewonyo, Avagyan, and Lynch because they did not submit a declaration or evidence regarding the reasonableness of their rates. (Opposition at pg. 11.) However, support for their rates are found in Mr. Shegerian's declaration. (See Shegerian Decl. ¶¶ 24-27.) Defendants fail to cite to any legal authority that a declaration by a managing partner is insufficient to attest to the experience of the timekeepers, who are his associates or associated counsel.

The Court finds that the hourly rates requested for each attorney excessive. As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish comparable rates of the community. (See *Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) The hourly rate should

also represent a blend of historical billing rate based on reasonable fees at the time the work was performed and current rate since the case spanned 6 years. Based on the Court's evaluation of the attorneys' skills and experience, this Court finds the following rates to be reasonable:

Name of Counsel	Yr Admitted	Hourly Rate requested	Adjusted Hourly rate
Shegarian	1990	$1,425	$1050
Nguyen	2008	$1,100	$825
Reed	2008	$1,000	$700
Livshits	2020	$700	$400 (blended rate)
Madjidi	2014	$900	$550
Rodriguez	2015	$850	$550
Lim	2016	$825	$600
Mcdonnell	1992	$1000	$700
Gbewonyo	2017	$750	$450
Avagyan	2013	$750	$500
David	2021	$625	$225 (blended rate)
Lynch	2021	$550	$250
Total	--	--	--

b. Reasonableness of Hours for Actual Work Performed

Defendants also object to the hours worked by Plaintiff's counsel.

Although detailed time records are not required, California Courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) "Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) ['the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter'].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice." (*Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.)

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Here, Plaintiff claims that 3,374 hours of attorney time was spent on litigating this action since its inception and has submitted documentation supporting the claimed number of hours worked. (Motion at pg. 13; Shegerian Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, 24-27, Exhs. 1, 8-12; Nguyen Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. 2; Reed Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 3; Leovshits Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 4; Madjidi Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. 5; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 6; Lim Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. 7.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that the total lodestar fee request should be reduced for several reasons. The Court shall address each in turn.

i. Limited Success

Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff were entitled to recover attorney fees, Plaintiff should not recover on claims where he achieved limited success. (Opposition at pg. 5.)

"[U]nder state law as well as federal law, a reduced fee award is appropriate when a claimant achieves only limited success" (*Sokolow v. County of San Mateo* (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 249.) However, where a successful claim is factually related or closely intertwined with claims that were unsuccessfully litigated, then fees are not reduced. (see *Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern California* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 431.)

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff achieved limited success because he only prevailed on his claim for FEHA retaliation, which was not factually intertwined with his claims for breach of contract, FEHA gender, age and disability discrimination claims. (Opposition at pp. 5-6.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to show the claims involved a common set of facts or legal theories. (Opposition at pg. 6, relying on *Harman, v. City and Cnty. Of San Francisco* (2007) 158 Cal. App.4th 407, 417.) They further assert that retaliation claim involved a legal theory that was separate and apart from the one relied upon in his discrimination claims, and during a six-week trial, testimony regarding Plaintiff's retaliation claim spanned only a number of days. (Opposition at pg. 6.) Thus, Defendants requested the fee award be reduced by at least 50%. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff argues that Defendants proposed fee reduction based on limited success is inappropriate. First, Plaintiff contends that a blanket reduction for unsuccessful claims is disallowed. (Reply at pg. 3, relying on *Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Cmty. Dev. Com. of City of Escondido* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1369 ["the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit."].) Second, Plaintiff asserts that all the claims arose from the same course of conduct that Defendants carried out during Plaintiff's last year of employment, and as a result, all of the claims were factually intertwined. (Reply at pp. 3-4.) Third, Plaintiff asserts that he ultimately prevailed and achieved the relief that he sought in the form of general, special and punitive damages. (Reply at pg. 4.)

The Court finds that Defendants suggested blanket reduction of 50% inappropriate. Apportionment is permissible where the opposing party has identified work that was "chargeable only to her unsuccessful causes of action." (See *Cordero-Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1286.) The Court rejects Defendants' contention that Plaintiff's claims are not factually related. Plaintiff alleged he was retaliated against "for seeking to exercise rights guaranteed under FEHA and/or assisting and/or participating in an investigation." (Opposition at pg. 6; Compl. ¶ 21.) "[E]mployment discrimination cases, by their very nature, involve several causes of action arising from the same set of facts." (*Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1251.) Further, the Defendants' reasons for terminating Plaintiff are the same, irrespective of the various legal theories or claims brought by Plaintiff for recovery. Much of the trial focused on whether those reasons were pretextual. "[T}he liability issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not" because of the overlapping nature of FEHA claims. (See *Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133.

ii. Duplicative Billing

Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's case was overstaffed with attorneys and billing entries evidence duplicative billing. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.)

Inefficient and duplicative efforts by counsel are not to be compensated. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001); *Premier Medical Mgmt. Systems, Inc. v. Calfornia Ins. Guarantee Assn.* (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4tl 550, 556 ["padded" fee bills are not to be compensated].) However, "[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice." (*Etcheson v. FCA US LLC* (2018) 30 Cal. App. 5th 831, 848.)

Here, Defendants reason that no explanation has been provided as to why this case necessitated 12 attorneys to prosecute and argue that the Court should exercise its discretion in reducing fees on this ground. (Opposition at pg. 7, relying on *Donahue v. Donahue* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271 and *Morris v. Hyundai Motor America* (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) Defendants further argue that duplicative billing was evident during trial where several of Plaintiff's attorneys were present during trial but did not meaningfully participate. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.) This was acknowledged by the Court on the record. (Opposition; Moss Decl., Exh. 3 (Nov. 18, 2021 Tr. at pp. 233:20-234:22 ["If there is an attorney's fees motion, I'm not giving you five people sitting here all day."") Defendants further point to other instances of duplicative/excessive billing as it related to the depositions of Suzanne Elliot and Alfred Bottalico where more than one attorney would be present, but their participation was limited or nonexistent. (Opposition at pg. 8.)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to show any time entries were necessarily duplicative or that the trial time sought by multiple attorneys was excessive. (Reply at pg. 5.) The Court finds this argument to be unpersuasive. Excessive billing was evident from the fact that several attorneys billed for days spent at trial when they were not all meaningfully contributing to the prosecution of this case each trial day. Further, the Court clearly indicated on the record that it found the presence of several attorneys during trial to be unnecessary. (Moss Decl., Exh. 3 (Nov. 18, 2021 Tr. at pp. 233:20-234:22.) Moreover, the Court is not going to award fees for attorneys who sat in depositions to merely observe. (See Moss Decl., Exh. 1 at pp. 8:1-11, 129:8-15, 189:1-4 and Exh. 2 at pp. 38:9-10, 52:25-53:1.)

The Court finds an across-the-board reduction of 10% is appropriate to account for the overstaffing and the instances of duplicative/excessive billing.

iii. Fees for Travel Time

Defendants generally object to the fees associated with travel time. (Opposition at pg. 9.) They claim that stand-alone travel entries account for 92.8 hours and that 1,194.4 hours are block-billed to include some travel. (*Id.*) Defendants asserts that the entries that state "travel to and from trial and trial" amount to block-billing because they were billed between 9.1 to 10.9 hours and trial was typically 8 hours. (*Id.*) Thus, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's counsels were each billing 1-2 hours for travel for each day of trial.

In reply, Plaintiff argues that the time spent traveling was necessary for trial, depositions (in and out-of-state) and other hearings. (Reply at pg. 6.) The Court agrees.

The Court's across-the-board- reduction of 10% would also cover any excessive travel time, to the extent there were any.

Unnecessary Discovery

Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be rewarded for his attorneys' inefficient method of discovery, which was evident from the fact that 30 depositions were conducted, and of the people deposed fewer than half were called as witnesses during trial. (Opposition at pg. 9.) While Defendants generally complain about Plaintiff's discovery, they failed to meet their burden in identifying the depositions that were improper or unnecessary. Thus, without any substantiating evidence, Defendants' objections to the time spent on discovery merely amounts to speculation. (See *Etcheson, supra,* 30 Cal. App. 5th at 848.)

iv. Exclusion of Non-Attorney Work

Lastly, Defendants argue that the non-attorney work conducted by attorneys Livshits pre-June 24, 2020 and by David pre-November 24, 2021 should be omitted from the fee award because they had not been admitted into the California State Bar prior to those dates. (Opposition at pp. 9.) Thus, Mr. Livshits billed 216.9 hours and Mr. David billed 33 hours, respectively, prior to their admission. (*Id.*)

In reply, Plaintiff argues that recovery of fees for law clerks is permissible. (Reply at pg. 9, relying on *Margolin v. Reg'l Planning Com.* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1006-1007.) The Court finds it appropriate to allow Plaintiff to recovery fees for hours worked by attorneys Livshits and David when they were law clerks at a reduced rate. Therefore, the rates for them reflect a blended rate of time as law clerks and attorneys.

v. Summary of Hours and Calculations

The Court determines the calculation based on the rates found to be reasonable:

Name	Total Hours	Adjusted Hourly rate	Total Charge requested	Adjusted Total Charge (based on adjusted hourly rate)
Shegarian	584.2	$1050	$832,485.00	$613,410.00
Nguyen	758.3	$825	$834,130.00	$625,597.50
Reed	341.3	$700	$341,300.00	$238,910.00
Livshits	713.6 (216.9 hours before admission)	$400 (blended rate)	$499,520.00	$285,440.00
Madjidi	388.3	$550	$349,470.00	$213,560.00
Rodriguez	250.8	$550	$213,180.00	$137,500.00
Lim	206.6	$600	$170,445.00	$123,960.00
Mcdonnell	5.6	$700	$5,600.00	$3,920.00
Gbewonyo	8.2	$450	$6,150.00	$3,690.00
Avagyan	61.3	$500	$45,975.00	$30,650.00
David	39.5 (33 hours billed before admission)	S225 (blended rate)	$24,687.50	$8,887.50
Lynch	16.3	$250	$8,965.00	$4,075

Total	--	--	$3,331,907.50	**$2,289,600.00**
Total w/ a 10% reduction	--	--	--	**$2,060,640.00**

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff's reasonable lodestar attorney fee award to be $2,060,640.00.

3. Lodestar Multiplier

Plaintiff seeks a lodestar multiplier of 2. (Motion at pg. 13.)

While the lodestar reflects the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community, it may be adjusted based on various factors, including "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award" and (4) the success achieved. (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) The burden of proof to support such a multiplier is on the prevailing party. (*Ketchum*, *supra*, 24 Cal.4th at 1138.)

Nonetheless, the court must not consider extraordinary skill and the other *Serrano* factors to the extent these are already included with the lodestar. (*Id.* at 1138-1139.) "[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable." (*Id.* at 1139.)

"Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b) thus authorizes an award of *reasonable* attorney fees, not an award of reasonable fees plus an enhancement. Nonetheless, it is recognized that some form of fee enhancement may be appropriate and necessary to attract competent representation of cases meriting legal assistance." (*Weeks v. Baker McKenzie* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1172.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that the application of a lodestar multiplier is warranted because the factors set forth in *Serrano* have been met. (Motion at pp. 14-15; Reply at pp. 9-10.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to a lodestar fee enhancement because the case did not involve novel issues, there is no proof that Plaintiff's counsel was precluded from taking on other matters, and the firms' contingency risk is exaggerated. (Opposition at pp. 11-15.)

The Court finds that the requested lodestar multiplier of 2.0 is not warranted. However, due to the success achieved by Plaintiff, a modest multiplier is warranted. First, although Government Code § 12965(c) involves a fee-shifting provision that creates "a reasonable expectation that attorney fees would not be limited by the extent of recovery and that [plaintiff's] attorneys would receive full compensation for their efforts" (*Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1175.), there is still a contingency risk to the case in the event the Plaintiff is not successful. Second, although the skill portrayed by Plaintiff's attorneys is represented in their lodestar award, the Court finds the Plaintiff's trial legal team displayed extraordinary skill beyond the lodestar fee. Plaintiff's attorneys successfully prosecute the client's claims against one of the best defense teams. Ms. Hermle and her team of lawyers were excellent in every respect. In fact, the defense team was successful in defeating many of Plaintiff's claims. The quality of the legal representation afforded to Plaintiff exceeded the rates that are charged by comparably skilled attorneys. (See *Ketchum*, *supra*, 24 Cal.4th at 1138-1139.) Third, it is clear from the evidence presented by Defendants that Plaintiff's attorneys were not precluded from taking on new cases. (See Moss Decl., Exh. 5.) However, Plaintiff's attorneys were precluded from trying other cases that were ready for trial during the timeframe of this trial. (RT 11/30/22 p.18, lines 14-22.) Finally, despite the fact that this is a single Plaintiff case, it is not a run of the mill employment case. This case involves a high level executive, an older white male, whose employers claimed to have terminated him for his alleged inappropriate conduct, amongst other things, toward women. For his attorneys to successfully show and argue the reasons for his termination were pretextual during the height of the "me too" movement required exceptional skills.

Accordingly, a modest multiplier of 1.1 is warranted.

Conclusion

The Court grants Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $2,266,704, which included a modest multiplier of 1.1 ($2,060,640 x 1.1= $2,266,704)

It is so ordered.

Dated: January 20, 2023

Hon. Ruth A. Kwan
Judge of the Superior Court

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